

Post-tsunami Sri Lanka and the Ethnic Conflict

A Critical Analysis of Vulnerability

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Abstract

This dissertation intends to evaluate the relationship between natural disasters and conflict using the discourse of vulnerability analysis. This study will analyze first, whether this discourse is useful in understanding the events occurring in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, namely the resumption of the conflict, and second, how it informs Sri Lanka's prospects for resolving its multifaceted goals of reconstruction, development and peace. This dissertation argues that vulnerability analysis will be useful in understanding the effects of natural disasters on Sri Lanka's political situation as vulnerability analysis implicates the political, social and historical issues of country, moving the discourse away from a scientific and technical approach to natural disaster rehabilitation. This dissertation shows that one cannot ignore the role of conflict and focus solely on reconstruction, as has been proved by post-tsunami events in Sri Lanka.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

When the reverberations of an underwater earthquake sent a tsunami wave hurtling towards countries in South Asia in 2004, one of its biggest victims was Sri Lanka, a country that has been undergoing over twenty years of ethnic conflict. The sheer power of the wall of water would cause the deaths of thousands, destroying villages, homes and livelihoods, provoking an outpouring of aid and sympathy from countries all around the world.

Sri Lanka was the country that was hit the hardest, after Indonesia, with approximately 36,000 people dead and over one million displaced from their homes. The Northern and Eastern provinces, which were among the places that suffered the greatest, with over 20,000 dead, also happens to be the home of a long-running separatist struggle. Though the tsunami hit other parts of the island as well, this dissertation will focus on the Northern and Eastern provinces specifically, due to the presence of the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (LTTE, also known as the “Tamil Tigers”) in these areas, a military organization fighting against the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) to create a separate Tamil state from the rest of the country, which is comprised of a Sinhala majority.

This dissertation intends to study the relationship between natural disasters and conflict. The question of whether the tsunami affected Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and prospects for peace will be addressed. There is a possibility that the tsunami, as it changed the landscape with its brute force, also affected the landscape of the conflict between the GOSL and the LTTE in some way as “even the responses to such a massive human disaster had been fundamentally intertwined with some core issues of the ethnic conflict” (Uyangoda, 2005: 344). Another possibility that exists is that the tsunami did nothing to alter the antagonistic relations “in any fundamental way” (Huxley, 2005: 130). This dissertation intends to evaluate the relationship between natural disasters and conflict using the discourse of vulnerability analysis. This study will analyze first, whether this discourse is useful in understanding the events occurring in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, namely the resumption of the conflict,

and second, how it informs Sri Lanka's prospects for resolving its multifaceted goals of reconstruction, development and peace. In addition, a comparative section on Indonesia will be included to better comprehend the situation in Sri Lanka as it appears that, in contrast, Indonesia, has successfully used the tsunami to catalyze positive change.

This topic was chosen because Asia as a whole is expected to experience a greater vulnerability to natural disasters in the coming decade. Indeed, during the 1971-1995 period, the highest percentage of "the most precarious human impact of 'natural triggered' disasters took place in Asia (87.5%) relative to any other continent" (Haque, 2003: 467). Therefore, these areas must be made aware of the political, economic and social influences which will affect the success of disaster mitigation and the reduction of vulnerability. The study of Sri Lanka in particular, focusing on the relationship between conflict and vulnerability, will add to this knowledge.

STRUCTURE OF RESEARCH

This dissertation argues that vulnerability analysis will be useful in understanding the effects of natural disasters on Sri Lanka's political situation as vulnerability analysis implicates the political, social and historical issues of country, moving the discourse away from a scientific and technical approach to natural disaster rehabilitation

Following this introductory chapter (Chapter One), Chapter Two will explain the theoretical framework of the discourse of vulnerability analysis and develop its connection to conflict, with specific references to Sri Lanka. Chapter Three will present the history of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Chapter Four will describe the methodology used, followed by an examination of the observations resulting from primary research in Chapter Five. This dissertation will conclude in Chapter Six with a discussion of the results and a critical analysis of the discourse of vulnerability

Chapter Two

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS AND SRI LANKA

CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

Contrary to popular belief, the devastating impact of a natural disaster is not solely due to powerful forces of nature. There are pre-existing frailties that can intensify the level of suffering after such catastrophes. The actual event is more appropriately termed as a “hazard”. To fully comprehend the causes behind the suffering that occurs due to a natural hazard, it is necessary to include the political, economic, and social aspects of a country. The inclusion of these aspects along with the effects of a hazard is better termed as a “natural disaster”. Therefore, the definition of disaster that will be used in this paper is that “a disaster occurs when a significant number of vulnerable people experience a hazard and suffer severe damage and/or disruption of their livelihood system in such a way that recovery is unlikely without external aid” as it acknowledges the multifaceted nature of disasters (Blaikie et. al 2004: 50).

Vulnerability analysis posits “that while hazards may be natural, disasters are generally not” (Bankoff 2004: 29). Therefore the focus on the destructiveness of disasters as being caused purely by forces of nature creates solutions that are simplistic, misleading and ultimately ineffective (Alexander 1997). Vulnerability is a process embedded in the social environment and “is generated by social, economic and political processes that influence how hazards affect people in varying ways and with differing intensities” (Blaikie et al. 2004: 7). The purpose of vulnerability analysis is to “demonstrate that there are particular characteristics of different groups of people which mean that with the impact of a particular type of hazard of a given intensity, some avoid disaster and others do not” (Cannon, 1994: 17).

DISCOURSE OF VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

According to Immink (2004), “a discourse is a storyline that can be described as a specific ensemble of ideas and concepts which are produced and transformed in policy practices” (388). Vulnerability analysis can follow this framework, as it offers a set of beliefs and recommendations for analyzing weaknesses and preventing conditions from worsening. The relevance of such recommendations and how they are constructed will be analyzed in the context of post-tsunami Sri Lanka.




Figure 1: from www.recoverlanka.net

In the framework of discourse analysis it is also necessary to analyze the actors involved; in this case, the GOSL and the LTTE. How they verbalize their positions, interact and collaborate with one another is of great interest as it is in the “discursive domain that local actors will use multiple ways trying to legitimate policy” (Lindseth, 2005: 68). Therefore, the discourse of vulnerability analysis can be used to understand post-tsunami events in Sri Lanka, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

Vulnerability Discourse and the Reconstruction Process

Collaborative decision-making is a key issue in vulnerability discourse and in post-tsunami reconstruction as, “[vulnerability] assessment provides potential possibilities for collaborative decision-making by various actors because of its focus on issues of physical processes, human environment and social adjustments to hazards and losses” (Immink, 2004: 396). Vulnerability analysis can be used to improve such collaboration as it focuses on the shared burden rather than apportioning blame. The applicability of this discourse, especially in regards to collaboration is intriguing in the context of Sri Lanka, where the two actors present are also enemies.

The importance of collaboration and cooperation lies in Sri Lanka’s reconstruction. According to Shaw (2006), “it is very important to have a proper coordination among different stakeholders: government, international organizations, people and international NGOs” (9). If there is poor coordination between the GOSL and the LTTE, the people in the LTTE-controlled areas will suffer disparately from the rest of the country. Therefore, problems with discourse such as a lack of collaboration and cooperation due to conflict enhances vulnerability. It is important that “the reconstruction program should try to establish a strong bond within the community and also within different related stakeholders” (Shaw, 2006: 10).

CONFLICT AND VULNERABILITY

Vulnerability analysis, in its holistic approach, is uniquely capable of addressing the link between conflict and natural disasters. This link has not been fully developed, though according to an article by Tommasoli (2003), it is attracting more attention. Those that do mention this link tend to only discuss the economic inequalities that cause conflict. In the case of the Sri Lanka however, the reasons for the longevity of the conflict go beyond economics, and are rooted in the political, social and cultural spheres. Cannon (1994) does raise an important query, which is, “does the vulnerability approach involve irreconcilable conflicts, since we have to live with governments and systems (national and international) that maintain the economic inequity which causes vulnerability?” (28). Disasters do not so much create vulnerability as interact with and exacerbate pre-existing vulnerability (McEntire, 2001: 190). This dissertation will expand the understanding that the literature of vulnerability analysis has of the relationship between natural disasters and conflict.

Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern Provinces have been in a vulnerable position because of the ethnic conflict, and now, after the tsunami in 2004 much of that vulnerability has been compounded. According to the vulnerability discourse, conflict aggravates vulnerability in a myriad of ways. During conflict, a large number of people are displaced, leading to risks of increased exposure to disease and violence and “socially vulnerable groups in extreme natural events are often also vulnerable to abuse” (Blaikie et al, 2004: 27). Crucially, “violent conflict can interfere with the provision of relief and recovery assistance” (Blaikie et al. 2004: 28). International aid is used as another tool of grievance in violent conflict because, as said by Tommasoli (2003), “all aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives, for peace or for war, regardless of whether these effects are deliberate, recognized or not, before, during or after war” (7).

While the discourse of vulnerability analysis recognizes the link between conflict and vulnerability, it does not offer a approach for the two factors to be resolved together, or take into account the role of conflict and age-old antagonisms trumping over any desire to cooperate, especially

if such cooperation can be seen as a sign of “giving in” on the part of any actor. The discourse of vulnerability analysis speaks of possibilities for collaborative decision-making between different actors, but says little if the potential for collaboration is preceded by years of violence and mutual distrust.

Window of Opportunity: Collaboration

Vulnerability analysis proponents also speak of disasters as a *window of opportunity*, “to redesign, revise or rebuild damaged human environments” (Comfort et al. 1999: 40). If this window is overlooked, proponents believe that “the vulnerability of built and natural environments in risk-prone regions continues to increase as a result of recurring damage” (Comfort et al. 1999: 40). In the moments after a natural disaster, prior political relationships, factions and connections may be equally as shaken as the foundations of a building. It is this moment of *potential* transformation, after the disaster has struck, which is of interest, as many political groups are made vulnerable by the effects of the natural disaster.

Hilhorst (2004) also highlights that such disasters can either “enhance radical change or bureaucratic reform” or “reinforce existing power relations”, describing the potentiality of such different outcomes occurring (61). Analysis of vulnerability and events that occurred after the tsunami will indicate whether forces for radical change or for status quo will prevail in Sri Lanka, in terms of the reconstruction process.

Reducing vulnerability also requires engaging different actors on the national and international level, including representatives of ethnic minorities (Comfort et al: 1999). It is difficult, however, to engage different national actors and minorities when these actors are locked in conflict. In the case of Sri Lanka, “enmity and mistrust has also acted as a deterrent to the delivery of effective aid” (Spiegel 2005: 1916).

Conflict and Reconstruction

Post-tsunami reconstruction efforts of rebuilding communities and reducing vulnerability goes beyond the construction of new homes because “[without] an understanding of the local, political and cultural complexities,” attempts to resolve any problems will be difficult (Macrae and Zwi 1992: 300-301). A deeper understanding of conflict through the discourse of vulnerability is necessary.




Figure 2: Effect of conflict and natural disasters on reconstruction (constructed by author)

Conflict can also divert “national and international financial and human resources that could be used for the mitigation of risk away from extreme natural events” and destroy infrastructure such as roads and dams (Blaikie et al, 2004: 27). In short, violent conflict can “block, erode, or annihilate the social and political institutions, and related participatory mechanisms, that are so important to peacefully manage social, economic and political change,” showing conflict to be as devastating as forces of nature (Tommasoli 2003: 3). The vulnerability discourse can “help to develop knowledge about interrelations between physical and social processes, and it can guide in establishing a better understanding of the complex interactions between them” (Immink 2004: 392).

The literature written on vulnerability analysis focuses on the need to consider other prevailing influences to explain the problems that people face before and after a natural disaster. While a great deal of this literature studies vulnerability due to poverty or environmental degradation, less has been written on the ramifications that conflict will have for reconstruction in a post-natural disaster context. This dissertation will take the discourse of vulnerability in that direction. The relationship between

vulnerability and conflict is an important one, as both concepts feed into one another, creating a cycle of continued violence. For example, tsunami reconstruction and the peace process may prove to be inextricably linked (Inderfurth et al, 2005). The ability to create a successful reconstruction program that will reduce vulnerability therefore may be obstructed in Sri Lanka as such coordination is problematized due to the ethnic conflict.

Chapter Three

SRI LANKA AND THE ETHNIC CONFLICT

SRI LANKAN CONFLICT

To date, the Sri Lankan conflict has claimed the lives of over 64,000 people and has left thousands displaced in the space of two decades. Although the violence is ostensibly played out between the armed forces of the GOSL and the LTTE, the majority of those killed are civilians. Though the roots of the conflict lies in past colonial history, the conflict officially began in 1983, when simmering tensions between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority erupted, when news of “the death of 13 soldiers at the hands of the Tamil Tigers in Jaffna triggered an island-wide riot in which over 1,000 people were killed” (Ramanathapillai, 2006: 8). While there are other groups in Sri Lanka, such as the Muslims (7%), most of the violence has tended to be concentrated among the Sinhalese (74%) and the Tamils (18%) (Reuters, 2006).

In 2002, there was hope that the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) would usher in a period of growth and prosperity and perhaps even a lasting peace settlement to end the twenty-year long war. The CFA, which was brokered by Norway, agreed to allow Tamils to have autonomy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Mikaelsson, 2002). The CFA called for, among other things, an immediate cessation of any offensive military operations, the separation of GOSL’s and LTTE’s armed forces, freedom of movement for unarmed military and LTTE members through the Northern and Eastern areas and that all parties should create confidence-building measures in order to restore “normalcy” for all Sri Lankans (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, 2002).

Due to disagreements between the GOSL and the LTTE, approximately two years after the CFA was signed, it became clear that both were preparing for a resumption of hostilities (Loganathan, 2005: 3). In the following months after the tsunami, the violence resumed, with attacks made on the army and

civilians, and assassinations made on both anti-LTTE officials as well as LTTE sympathizers. Lakshman Kadirgamar, the anti-LTTE Foreign Minister, an ethnic Tamil who was responsible for getting the LTTE banned as a terrorist group in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, was assassinated in August 2005, allegedly by the LTTE. This was followed by the assassination of Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-LTTE Minister in December 2005; the killer(s) remain unknown.

VULNERABILITY DISCOURSE AND THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT

In Sri Lanka, the ethnic conflict has created a sensitive climate in which international aid donors must tread carefully. The situation can be worsened if both sides of the conflict feel that they are being shortchanged by each other and the international community. For example, when the LTTE complained that the GOSL was obstructing their access to aid, a heightening of tensions was created which not only increased the vulnerability for the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but also led to a further unraveling of relations between the two. The inclusion of conflict within the discourse of vulnerability broadens the framework, and becomes more pertinent in understanding the ethnic conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction in Sri Lanka.

Dealing with the vulnerability that was not only created by the tsunami, but that which was already present due to conflict, is a crucial step in disaster mitigation as “[there] is mounting evidence of increased social stress and escalating conflicts stemming from the failure to deal effectively with the enduring disaster” (Stonich, 2001). For example, the LTTE resents the actions of the GOSL portraying it as a group that could not protect its constituents, as an attempt to exacerbate the vulnerability of its organization (Loganathan, 2005: 6). Grievances also arose among the people of the Northern and Eastern provinces, as a reaction to the lack of care offered by the LTTE, or due to the perceived obstruction of aid by the GOSL.

INDONESIA AND SRI LANKA

A section on Indonesia is included for comparative reasons in order to portray an example of a country that took advantage of the *window of opportunity* successfully. Sri Lanka and Indonesia have undergone years of conflict; the Indonesian conflict began in 1976 with over 15,000 people dead, and the Sri Lankan conflict began in 1983 with over 64,000 people dead. Both countries were unable to reach a lasting ceasefire between their antagonistic groups, with the separatist group, *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) accusing Jakarta of exploiting its resources and the LTTE believing the GOSL unwilling to protect Tamil interests. Then in 2004, the tsunami hit the Aceh province of Indonesia and the coasts of Sri Lanka. Indonesia and Sri Lanka were the countries that were hit the hardest; 170,000 dead in Indonesia and 36,000 dead in Sri Lanka. Similarities end here as Indonesia has gone down a more positive path than Sri Lanka, and has reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with GAM in August 2005 that is enduring meaningfully to date.

What factors and influences were present in Indonesia that were not present in Sri Lanka in order to create such a different outcome? One explanation could be that there was credible political commitment to go down the track of peace rather than war from the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. When President Yudhoyono was running for president, he had promised to scale down the military force in Aceh, saying that “[the] main pillar for the self-empowerment of Aceh must be a non-military solution” (Kearney, 2004). How the separatist groups are labeled could be another issue. GAM is known in the international community as a *separatist* organization, while the LTTE has been recognized as a *terrorist* organization by major countries such as the United States in 1997 and the United Kingdom in 2000. The European Union and Canada have recently done the same as well, both placing the LTTE on their lists of terrorist organizations in 2006, following the assassination of Kadirgamar.

*Chapter Four***METHODOLOGY**

This dissertation attempts to analyze whether the discourse of vulnerability analysis can be extended to understand the events occurring in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, namely the resumption of the conflict. The data gathered is qualitative rather than quantitative because qualitative data is more useful in analyzing the discourses of vulnerability and conflict through observations of people's lived experiences. Any conclusions drawn from people's lived experiences cannot be transcribed into numbers and generated into statistical tables. Qualitative research, especially in the form of interviewing, is particularly appropriate as it "concentrates on the *contents* of interview answers, which reveal something about phenomena or processes occurring either in participants' inner realities or in external reality" (Talja, 1999: 12)

This topic of this thesis will be analyzed through the lens of the discourse of vulnerability analysis. The interview questions and results have been divided into three major themes: discourse of vulnerability analysis, conflict and vulnerability analysis, and lastly, the contrast between Indonesia and Sri Lanka. This structure was chosen as it creates an evolving structure of how the relationship between vulnerability and conflict was built and will attempt to produce an account of the situation in Sri Lanka (Mays and Pope, 1995).

This study relies heavily on primary and secondary research. Primary research in the form of interviews were chosen in order to canvass a broad range of people who are involved or aware of the political situation of Sri Lanka as well as the status of post-tsunami reconstruction. Forty people were contacted and nine interviews were conducted, from mid-July 2006 to early August 2006. The conversations were all conducted in English and, apart from two, were all done over the telephone or Skype, an Internet phone program. The other two interviewees answered questions via e-mail. It was decided, due to the sensitivity of this issue in Sri Lanka and because of the ongoing conflict, that all

interviewees would remain anonymous. All interviews, except for three, were recorded. Two of the three that were not recorded were because the interviews were conducted over e-mail, in the form of a questionnaire, while the third interviewee requested that the interview not be recorded. Handwritten notes were taken in this case. Direct quotes from interviews have only been taken from those that agreed to be recorded.

An effort to talk to a wide range of people involved in natural disaster issues and/or the Sri Lankan conflict was made, and of the nine interviews; three were Sinhalese, three were Tamil, and four were of non-Sri Lankan nationality. Unfortunately, none of the interviewees are from the Sri Lankan Muslim community. Two interviewees work for NGOs located in Batticaloa, an area located in the Eastern province of Sri Lanka which experienced both the destructive impact of the tsunami as well as conflict. Two interviewees were academics; one involved in natural disaster studies, the other involved in the relationship between war and the environment. Another interviewee is a Sri Lankan human rights activist and another is a lawyer and a journalist. Two people from UNICEF were also interviewed; one works as an Emergency Project Officer, the other as the Chief of Tsunami Support. As these two were interviewed together, they shall be considered as one single interview. As for the other two interviewees, one works for the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) in Sri Lanka while the other is involved in the local government in Trincomalee, a town located in the Eastern province. In-depth biographies of all interviewees will be included in the Appendix (3).

The interviews were semi-structured and the questions were meant to gain an understanding of the different players and their interaction with each other, yet also allow the interviewees the freedom to elaborate on other issues or ideas related to the subject. Indeed, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for the author to deeply understand the complexity and passion existing within this subject that may not have come up in structured interviews. Due to the differences in backgrounds, while there was a core list of questions that were asked to all interviewees as was recommended by Britten (1995), not all questions were asked to all interviewees but were addressed to only a few (see Appendix 4).

Due to the sensitivity of the issue, trustworthiness was also a factor. Bearing in mind that the author is of Sinhalese descent (though not a Sri Lankan national) and that such descent was obvious to those who were interviewed, the level of comfort certain interviewees had in freely discussing post-tsunami reconstruction and conflict issues, whether unconsciously or consciously felt, with the author may be debatable.

Secondary research was mainly in the forms of books, newspaper articles, journal articles and the Internet. Documents from research think tanks such as the Centre for Policy Alternatives, which is based in Sri Lanka, were used to help construct for the reader as accurate a picture of the vulnerability and description of the day-to-day life of the people of Sri Lanka and specifically those located in the Northern and Eastern provinces. As the conflict in Sri Lanka has been renewed and every day brings more and more news of violence and less of post-tsunami reconstruction, obtaining access to people willing to answer questions became increasingly difficult and it was necessary to rely on media such as newspapers and the radio for information.

Chapter Five

OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS

Results from the interviews have been divided into three sections, which is better understood as an evolution of concepts and follows the relationship between vulnerability and conflict. The first theme that runs throughout many of the interviews dealt primarily with the discourse of vulnerability analysis and the different actors that interact with one another. Who these actors are and how they coordinate and collaborate with one another, or how they try to exclude the other creates the first layer of vulnerability in Sri Lanka. The second theme moves on from the first, focusing on the relationship between conflict and vulnerability. The final theme is the comparison between Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

DISCOURSE OF VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The Actors

The initial interview questions dealt with setting the stage of all the players who are involved in post-tsunami reconstruction. The GOSL, the LTTE and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) were considered to be the major actors (Interview 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). On a smaller scale, local NGOs and private donors were also part of rehabilitation. The international donor community is seen as a major player as well, though the wishes of this group can perhaps be seen in the workings between the GOSL and NGOs, both local and international (Interview 4). Therefore most of the discourse dealing with actors involved with post-tsunami reconstruction focuses on this triad: the GOSL, the LTTE and the INGOs. Aid has been channelled to the Northern and Eastern provinces mainly through the work of INGOs, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), and through government infrastructure already present in these areas (Interview 3, 4).

Marginalization

The first theme, the discourse of vulnerability analysis, in itself, tended to focus on the idea of exclusion, for those who are excluded cannot make their words heard. When asked who was involved in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of tsunami-affected areas, the conversation quickly moved from who was involved to how the situation slid back into conflict. While the GOSL is seen as one of the major actors involved in post-tsunami reconstruction (Interview 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), along with the NGOs and INGOs, an interviewee who lives in Trincomalee (Interview 7), was quite emphatic in stating that it was only the NGOs who had done post-tsunami reconstruction in that area. Because of the conflict, the GOSL *and* the LTTE lost the trust of the people in the Northern and the Eastern Provinces. They no longer expect the GOSL to help, or that the LTTE would be able to fulfil all their basic needs (Interview 7). As Trincomalee is in one of the most conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka in the East, trust for the GOSL and the LTTE is minimal, and with the escalation of violence, deteriorating even more.

Identifying those who are involved in post-tsunami reconstruction not only denotes the responsibility that such players have in these areas but also gives them legitimacy and power.

The LTTE is insisting that they represent the people who are not represented by the government...they want to be on par with the government...they are trying to claim that they already have a sovereign state. (Interview 3)

According to this view, the LTTE is claiming to be the legitimate representative for those excluded by the GOSL. This may explain why the GOSL was so hostile to the LTTE receiving aid and why some interviewees felt that the GOSL was trying to exclude the LTTE as the GOSL would not want the LTTE to be considered on equal footing with them.

Another group that has been singled out as suffering from exclusion in post-tsunami reconstruction is the Muslim community (Interview 3, 4). Indeed, “[given] the role played by the LTTE and the multiplicity of stakeholders in the North East, any future plans and initiatives must be inclusive of all relevant actors,” which means not only the Tamils and Sinhalese, but the Muslim community as

well (CPA, 2006: 5). The danger of excluding groups from reconstruction assistance may exacerbate the conflict situation in Sri Lanka. For example, the

differential patterns of aid distribution and instances of neglect and delay led to a climate of suspicion and accusations of exclusion, partiality and corruption. Especially the east and the north felt left out on the basis of their belonging to the minority groups of Tamils and Muslims (Frerks and Klem, 2005: 4).

The two groups; the GOSL and the LTTE may have exacerbated feelings of frustration. The GOSL by focusing on reconstructing the South, for example, and the LTTE for barring a Muslim representative from reconstruction and peace talks (Interview 3, 4).

Dichotomies of Suffering

A running theme across multiple sources was the belief that one group's suffering had more value than that of another group (Interview 1, 2, 7). While one area, or one group may have suffered more from the tsunami itself, the real source of grievance from these communities is from their perception that another area or community was benefiting at their expense. Three major dichotomies of suffering were apparent:

- (1) Sinhalese versus Tamil suffering
- (2) Northern and Eastern areas versus Southern areas
- (3) Tsunami-affected areas versus conflict-affected areas

All three dichotomies create resentment and grievances that can, if unchecked, hamper rehabilitation efforts and aggravate tensions already present in particular communities; the third point specifically may cause an increase in animosity (CPA, 2006: 14).

According to an academic involved in war and environment issues, the initial media attention on Sri Lanka served to set the stage for the Sinhalese-Tamil dichotomy, as most of the images of the

tsunami were from the South, which is predominantly Sinhalese, while the North and the East are mostly Tamil (Interview 2, 7, Frerks and Klem, 2005: 7). The failure, in the past, to deal with the needs of the people of the North and the East, in *addition* to that of the South “has stimulated armed opposition against what is seen as the Sinhala, rather than the Sri Lankan, state” (Nissan and Stirrat, 1990: 39).

The final dichotomy, tsunami-affected areas versus conflict-affected areas, is another problem frequently raised in the course of discussing post-tsunami efforts (Interview 1, 2, 3, 9). Due to experiencing over twenty years of war, many people in conflict-affected areas have had their homes destroyed. While the tsunami-affected areas also have had their homes destroyed, their homes have been rebuilt with greater speed than those who lives in conflict-affected areas (Frerks and Klem, 2005). This is because most of the aid that had been sent to Sri Lanka was *only* for those affected by the tsunami (Interview 1).

Window of Opportunity

The first six months after the tsunami hit the shores of Sri Lanka were marked as a time of great potential for the country, when the status of the conflict reached a fork in the road and could have gone down either direction. In the beginning, it did appear that the tsunami had created some measure of good and seemed to create a “conflict dampening effect” (Goodhand et al., 2005: 58). Therefore Sri Lanka had the “option to overcome the grievances” and to use the tsunami as a symbol to rally national unit for peace (Interview 6).

This fleeting opportunity, however, by many accounts was not seized upon. One reason is that the window created expectations that were bigger than what reality could actually provide – meaning that the expectation that one event, no matter how destructive and devastating, could “overcome the decades or sometimes centuries of enmity” is overly optimistic (Interview 6). As

said by an interviewee involved in the ICES, there was a chance for peace, but “unfortunately the government did not take the quick initiative to concentrate these initial stages”. (Interview 3)

The GOSL did not take advantage of the *window of opportunity* and missed the chance to make progress in the peace process along with tsunami reconstruction. The tsunami did “stimulate social energy,” initially encouraging cooperation between formerly antagonistic groups, but if that energy is not maintained or translated on the level of the major players like the GOSL, such energy is quickly dissipated (Goodhand et al., 2005: 58). Taking advantage of this opportunity was not achieved and due to this, the conflict has restarted and the political objectives of all concerned parties remain unchanged (Interview 3, 6). While there were hopes that the tsunami could bridge “the psychological gaps, the chasms between the Sinhalese on one hand and the Tamils on the other,” there is today a general consensus that the *window of opportunity* has been closed (Interview 3).

Collaboration and Cooperation

As the tsunami affected practically every region of the country, there was a moment when all interested parties could have potentially collaborated and cooperated with one another to create a more effective rehabilitation effort, as “particularly after a disaster, there is an excuse to collaborate, but it is people’s choice whether to take that excuse and to take that opportunity” (Interview 6). In the Sri Lankan context, however, the tsunami “intensified their separation rather than unifying them at this point” (Interview 2).

PTOMS

For example, the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) was initially meant to be a moment where such collaboration could be institutionalized. However, it was deemed unconstitutional by the Sri Lankan Supreme Court in September 2005, which found fault with the headquarters of the fund being in Kilinochchi, which is in rebel-controlled territory, as well as with the

workings of the regional fund, where the aid money would have been shared between the GOSL and the LTTE (Chen, 2005).

The P-TOMS was an agreement meant to set up a process for the GOSL and the LTTE to work together and share the over US \$3 billion in tsunami aid money (Raman, 2005). Once the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional, other effects began to occur; the United States government pulled out of the fund, and without the P-TOMS, the United States would not give money to a terrorist group (Cronin et al, 2004: 61). Therefore the opportunity to achieve some measure of cooperation was lost. The P-TOMS had been viewed “as an opportunity for the government and the LTTE to get together and hammer out” any disagreements (Interview 3). The blame for the failure of the P-TOMS has largely been placed in the laps of the GOSL (Interview 2, 7, 3, 6). Opposition to the P-TOMS did not come only from the Sri Lankan court; the Sinhalese nationalist party, *Janatha Vikmuthi Peramuna* (JVP) also criticized it, as did the Muslim community. The basis for the JVP’s opposition was because they felt that the P-TOMS would concede some measure of legitimacy to the LTTE, a contentious issue among peace negotiations which bled to tsunami reconstruction, while the Muslim community’s objections were because they were not “included in the negotiations on the mechanism to distribute humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid,” therefore believing that their interests were not looked after (Pirani and Kadirgamar, 2006: 1789).

CONFLICT AND VULNERABILITY

As tsunami reconstruction and peace building are intertwined in an intricate knot, analyzing where one begins and the other ends is a difficult process. This section will attempt to unravel this tangle by dealing with two specific hypotheses in considering the relationship between conflict and the discourse of vulnerability:

- (1) Effect of conflict on tsunami reconstruction
- (2) Effect of tsunami reconstruction on the conflict

The first effect is primarily technocratic in nature, meaning the difficulties in proceeding with post-tsunami reconstruction when the roads are blocked due to conflict, where checkpoints are at every corner, creating delays in the shipment of materials such as construction equipment (Interview 7, 8). The second effect is more political, involving political machinations and manoeuvring. Politicians from both the GOSL and LTTE have their own agendas, separate from what the people may want or need, and may actually have vested interests in promoting conflict.

Conflict and Tsunami Reconstruction

Both past conflict and present conflict has had an effect on post-tsunami reconstruction. An example of the former is with landmines that were planted before the tsunami struck and subsequently have been dislodged by the powerful wave, threatening not only the people living in those areas but also the aid missions (Burton, 2004). Logistical problems like the inability to send resources and equipment to tsunami-stricken areas also plague post-tsunami reconstruction in the conflict-affected areas in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the GOSL is worried that construction materials may be used to support the LTTE's fighting ability (Interview 8). Security is also problematic, with many INGOs and NGOs reportedly transferring their staff out of these areas and back to Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, due to the escalation of violence, leaving behind local staff. Lacking equipment and human resources, tsunami reconstruction in these areas is basically at a standstill (Interview 7).

An example of how the present conflict is affecting tsunami reconstruction can be seen in the town of Muttur. The French NGO, *Action Contre La Faim* (ACF), has just suspended its operations in Muttur, a town near Trincomalee, after its compound was attacked and two of its workers killed when trying to escape (BBC, 2006). This event follows an earlier report stating that fifteen of ACF's aid workers were shot and killed (BBC, 2006). It remains unclear who is responsible for the killings. ACF has been involved in improving food security and water sanitation, particularly after the tsunami, and also works with those internally displaced by the conflict and/or the tsunami (ACF website). Though

present violence remains localized in the Trincomalee district, there are fears that it may spread to around the region (Amnesty International, 2005).

In such an atmosphere, rehabilitation efforts are stymied, leaving those in need in aid more vulnerable than ever and livelihoods disrupted. For example, due to the escalation of violence, fishermen do not feel free to fish, fearing attacks from both the Sri Lankan navy and the Sea Tigers (the naval branch of the LTTE) (Interview 7). The provinces of the North and the East, having experienced years of conflict are now undergoing “another layer of destruction” following the tsunami (Interview 2).

Tsunami Reconstruction and Conflict

Tsunami reconstruction quickly became a “lightning rod for wider tensions and grievances” (Goodhand et al., 2005: 58). The problems that were affecting the peace process rapidly spread to rehabilitation efforts. Issues like the sharing of tsunami aid led to issues of sovereignty and legitimacy; whether or not a portion of the funds should be funnelled to the LTTE, or whether the GOSL should grant the LTTE self-governing legitimacy or have total control over the funds (Interview 5).

If the LTTE received some of the aid and was in charge of its disbursement, it was conjectured that this may have gone a long way in reshaping their image as an organization reliant on the funds of the Tamil community and diaspora, always taking and never giving (Interview 2). This may also have created a sentiment of goodwill – based on their effectiveness on distributing and managing the aid – from the international community and communities within Sri Lanka and would have given them the legitimacy that they want. Yet the GOSL may not have wanted to share funds with a terrorist organization and perhaps even believed that they could portray the LTTE as a weak organization unable to meet the needs of the people it claims to represent by not sharing the aid (Interview 4, 5). In the end, “all these politics actually eroded the peace process” as parties were unable to forego their political objectives and mutual mistrust for cooperation, which has, in turn, reinforced past grievances (Interview 2, 3, 5, 6).

The failure of the P-TOMS is responsible in some measure for the recommencement of violence for since the involved actors could not handle “the disbursement of the tsunami funds...how [could] they go about for a peace settlement...which they have been asking for?” (Interview 7). The tsunami efforts quickly became politicized by the conflict, unable to maintain a discrete and separate category. And the conflict, with a new set of grievances and evidence of discrimination, was filled again once more with a destructive energy (Perera, 2006).

INDONESIA AND SRI LANKA

There is a striking difference between Sri Lanka and Indonesia’s responses to the tsunami. The factors that represent the differences that exist between Indonesia and Sri Lanka regarding their respective conflicts, according to the research and interviews completed, are set forth and will be explained in further detail below (Interviews 3, 5, 6, 9).

- (1) Leadership
- (2) Labelling
- (3) Power of separatist groups

Leadership

The respective leadership of the two countries could not appear to be more different (Interview 6, 9). According to the Chief for Tsunami Support at UNICEF, who was stationed in Indonesia for some time, both President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla was able to garner support from a wide range of parties (Interview 9). In addition, Kalla had done previous work in peacekeeping, taking the role as a mediator in the conflict in Sulawesi, a province in Indonesia, and helped the warring parties reach an agreement in 2001 (ReliefWeb, 100, Interview 9). Kalla was also a member of the same political party of former dictator Suharto, *Golkar*, which enhanced his reputation

among the Indonesian military (TNI). President Yudhoyono also had the respect of the TNI as he is an ex-army General. The support of the TNI is crucial as they were the ones who were originally the strongest against negotiating with the GAM (Donnan and Hidayat, 2005). Therefore, these two had the necessary credibility to work towards a peace accord and were able to forge the MOU – a promise for peace and rehabilitation (Interview 6, 9). In fact, two days before the tsunami struck, negotiations between the government of Indonesia and the GAM had already begun (Interview 6).




Figure 3: Chart detailing Indonesia and Sri Lanka's path after the 2004 tsunami (constructed by author)

In Sri Lanka, however, Mahinda Rakapaksa's election as President in 2005 sent quite a different signal to Sri Lankans and those of the international community. Though he is a member of the *Sri Lankan Freedom Party* (SLFP), the same political party as the previous President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, his alliance with the extremist JVP party point to his strong ties to the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist cause. At this point, the level of influence that the JVP has is difficult to gauge. However, according to the Chief of Tsunami Support at UNICEF, "in the international community, he is regarded as being quite militant" (Interview 9).

Labels

The significance of GAM being labelled as an *insurgent* group and the LTTE as a *terrorist* group seems to have had a role to play in linkages between post-tsunami reconstruction and the peace processes of their respective countries even though the LTTE has been labelled as a terrorist organization by the European Union and Canada two years *after* the tsunami struck. The labels are important, however, in that the awareness of the conflicts stems from the use of such labels and for their effect on the international community's perceptions of the conflict (Interview 6, 9). For example, the GAM never used "psychologically devastating terrorist weapons" like the LTTE (Interview 6). The LTTE is also stronger than the GAM and has even attacked the capital of Sri Lanka, Colombo, with "impressive effectiveness" (Interview 6). This difference plays a role in public opinion, allowing for more sympathy for the GAM, even among Indonesians, as GAM has never attacked outside the province and has never attacked anyone who was not TNI or from the Indonesian government (Interviews 6, 9).

The labelling of the LTTE as a terrorist group by the world can weaken the organization, both in receiving donations and also in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the international community (Interview 3). Being considered a terrorist organization by the EU, as well as other countries, isolates the LTTE, which will make them unlikely to enter into any talks, if they fear that the cards will be stacked against them. This isolation may potentially push them into to turn to more violence, as "[wounded] tigers are dangerous" (Economist, 2006).

Power of separatist groups

Comparing GAM with the LTTE highlights a few crucial differences, especially in relation to the tsunami. Although the LTTE did lose some soldiers and boats, they were able to regain strength while the GAM could not – Aceh was completely devastated by the tsunami (Interview 5). Therefore, it was politically more convenient for GAM to reach a peace accord with the Indonesian government than for the LTTE with the GOSL, as GAM was too weak to recommence fighting (Interview 9).

The GAM rebel movement is also more coherent than that of the LTTE and was not racked by internal divisions, which may have made it better positioned to seek peace (Interview 6). In early 2004, the eastern branch of the LTTE broke away under the command of Colonel Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan) and has control of the Batticaloa and Ampara districts (IISS Armed Conflict Database). The “Karuna group” has challenged the parent LTTE group and allegedly the Karuna group has the support of the GOSL (Alston, 2005: 8-9). This has weakened the LTTE and has also led to an outbreak of violence among pro-Karuna groups and the LTTE. If the Karuna group has weakened the LTTE, the LTTE will be less likely to work on a peace process, as it may fear that the GOSL will take advantage of it when working out the terms of any agreement.

*Chapter Six***DISCUSSION**

This chapter intends to critically analyze the discourse of vulnerability analysis and its applicability in the context of post-tsunami Sri Lanka, particularly focusing on the Northern and Eastern provinces. Vulnerability analysis, with its emphasis on the multifaceted aspects of country's situation and its relation to disaster prevention and mitigation, is uniquely suited to Sri Lanka, which is suffering from a double jeopardy of over twenty years of conflict and the devastating impact of the tsunami. As the results have shown, post-tsunami reconstruction became deeply embedded in the politics of the conflict, an unfortunate intertwining which hampered the effectiveness of reconstruction and created an additional source of grievances to fuel the conflict to its present level of violence and killings.

It is argued that while the discourse of vulnerability analysis utilizes a vocabulary that would be more appropriate than that of technocratic disaster prevention and mitigation programs, vulnerability analysis itself treats conflict as a component that creates difficulties solely that of a scientific and technical nature, ignoring its role in the political, economic and social sphere. Terminology such as: cooperation, collaboration, trust, inclusion, and protection, which are utilized by the discourse of vulnerability, while optimistic, are inappropriate in the context of conflict, as the case of Sri Lanka proves. This dissertation believes that a fuller appreciation of how conflict colors the many facets of a country's situation is necessary and will create a deeper understanding of the benefits the discourse of vulnerability analysis can offer. This Chapter will attempt to answer the following hypotheses:

- Is the discourse of vulnerability analysis useful in understanding the events occurring in post-tsunami Sri Lanka?
- How does it inform Sri Lanka's prospects for resolving its goals of reconstruction and peace?

SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

Those who are vulnerable are not made so by the advent of a force of nature. Their vulnerability is *worsened*, but their condition was created long before the wave, earthquake or hurricane came their way. The lives of such populations are in a state of a “permanent emergency,” and a disaster brings such a state to light where, hopefully, awareness will turn into positive action (Bankoff, 2001: 25). It was hypothesized that the discourse of vulnerability analysis could be applied to a Sri Lankan context, because the populations that were most affected by the tsunami were also those whose day-to-day lives, as a result of conflict, were on intimate terms with fear, violence and intimidation.

When Huxley (2005) inferred that the tsunami did not affect the peace process and that the political stage remained unaffected, in part he was correct. The CFA had started to fray at the edges months before the disaster, with occurrences like the suicide bomb blast in Colombo in July 2004 and the escalation in violence being seen as a continuation of an already failing ceasefire. However, the tsunami became closely intertwined with peace issues. In the case of Sri Lanka, the poor attempts to collaborate made by both the LTTE and the GOSL over post-tsunami reconstruction has seen the conflict start once more with greater intensity, making the people in conflict-affected areas more vulnerable and reinforcing barriers, whether psychological or physical, between different ethnic groups (Hilhorst, 2004). Rehabilitation in such areas has come to a standstill and many have fled the areas, leaving homes that were newly reconstructed with tsunami aid monies. It is pointless speculation to wonder whether Sri Lanka’s peace process would have been in a better condition if the tsunami did not occur, but what is true is that the tsunami and reconstruction aid were taken as new weapons by both the GOSL and the LTTE to try and undermine each other’s position.

The P-TOMS could have represented a moment where all the interested parties – the GOSL, the LTTE, and the international community – realized that disaster rehabilitation needed to recognize the role of the conflict, especially as some of the most affected areas were under LTTE control. The P-TOMS, therefore, would have fit in with the counsel of proponents of vulnerability analysis for

collaboration (Blaikie et al, 2004, Comfort et al, 1999). This would have also increased the coordination between the two groups, and may have created a new aspect to their relationship that for once had no bearing in conflict or violence. Additionally, the P-TOMS would have made all the affected communities feel like their needs were being looked after, that is, if the voice of the Muslim community was included. In vulnerability analysis, to correctly comprehend the situation of a country, listening to the needs of those who are in the minority, or marginalized, is crucial in order to create a comprehensive approach addressing the diverse needs of the affected population. But with the P-TOMS declared unconstitutional, this avenue that may have led to peacemaking was not created. Part of the reasons why the P-TOMS was blocked is that it was believed to be giving into one of the LTTE's most sought after desire – legitimacy. And in a conflict situation, all issues operate via power relations; it is evident that conflict issues and tsunami reconstruction are not free from that power construct.

An example of the lack of freedom of the communities in the North and the East to shape their own futures can be seen during the Sri Lankan elections. It is widely believed that the hardliner Mahinda Rajapaksa beat his opponent Ranil Wickremasinghe, who was more conciliatory towards the LTTE, because the people in the North and the East were prevented from voting by the LTTE through fears of intimidation and violence, or felt disenfranchised by the GOSL and believed that their vote would be meaningless (BBC, 2005). The inability to make their voices heard in the elections incapacitates the power of the people.

When did the sounds of war drown out the discourse of vulnerability analysis? If vulnerability analysis is to work as an alternative to technocratic approaches to natural disaster reduction, it should also be able to work in conflict settings as well and not only in situations where a country is at peace and the natural disaster is merely a blip in its path. If hazards become disasters due to the already present factors which have exacerbated the already fragile states of communities, the conflict-affected states are those that should benefit the most from utilizing the vulnerability analysis discourse.

The discourse of vulnerability analysis is useful in post-tsunami Sri Lanka in the sense that it shows how things went wrong. There was no grasping of the *window of opportunity*; there was no

communication, collaboration or inclusion of all communities and their needs. Knowing the reasons why a certain theory did not work is not a meaningless exercise but a useful one, as it points out weaknesses and challenges that ought to be incorporated within the theoretical framework

CONCLUSION

The vulnerability discourse, at first glance, is ideally suited to post-tsunami Sri Lanka. The theory places the tsunami within the context of the political, social and economic factors of Sri Lanka, aware that vulnerability stems not only from the sheer violence of the force of nature but also from what came before. If a natural disaster affects vulnerable populations, dealing only with the damages caused by the tsunami is not sufficient. Building new homes in place of those that have been crushed by the wave yet doing nothing to stop the fighting is short sighted, for what is to stop the same homes from being destroyed by violence or the inhabitants fleeing their homes in fear for their lives?

While the vulnerability discourse is seemingly ideal in recognizing the trouble spots located in Sri Lanka, it is less helpful in taking the next step to decide what should be done to reconcile conflict issues with that of tsunami reconstruction. It is perhaps of interest to reiterate the question posed by Cannon (1994) which is, “does the vulnerability approach involve irreconcilable conflicts” since the government and other actors that the approach relies upon is often the source of the vulnerability (28)? This query highlights the paradox that exists within the discourse of vulnerability analysis in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. The problem with vulnerability analysis is that it utilizes a discourse that is inappropriate in conflict situation. Communication must happen, whether buildings are being reconstructed or a peace process is being worked out, but such communication is extremely difficult when years of conflict has led to mistrust and suspicion. All of the factors that are missing from Sri Lanka can come under the heading of trust. Lack of trust creates a vicious cycle; mistrust leads to problems in collaboration, which leads to miscommunication, then back to mistrust, with new reasons to restart the conflict.

In the end, Sri Lanka was unable to back away from the precipice of violence, partly due to the actions of the GOSL and the LTTE. The discourse of vulnerability analysis may have worked in the post-tsunami context but it was not grasped by the parties involved. A movement towards peace has to be desired among all the parties in power (i.e. GOSL, LTTE officials) and no amount of pressure from the international community can create a lasting peace if those involved from the country in question are not truly dedicated to working out a peace agreement.

If those in power do not desire peace, then the impetus has to come from the people. Perhaps discourse of vulnerability analysis could be used to empower local communities; working within such communities to not only reconstruct but to motivate action on a higher level, in order to improve their own protection in order (Cannon, 1994). However, that requires a degree of freedom of self-expression, which is not present in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The LTTE is not known for allowing the population in its control the freedom to manage their own protection (Goodhand et al., 2000). Rather it would view such actions as an attempt to dilute its own power. Conflict can destroy the avenues of empowerment and participatory mechanisms, preventing communities from grasping the power of the discourse of vulnerability analysis in disaster mitigation and prevention, again exacerbating the paradox within the discourse of vulnerability (Tommasoli, 2003: 3, Cannon, 1994: 28).

The discourse of vulnerability analysis does not explain how to resolve conflict but it does try to improve disaster mitigation methods. This dissertation shows, however, that one cannot ignore the role of conflict and focus solely on reconstruction, as has been proved by post-tsunami events in Sri Lanka. In order for Sri Lanka to resolve its goals of reconstruction and peace in the Northern and Eastern provinces, realization must set in that one factor cannot happen without the other, befitting the holistic approach of the vulnerability analysis.

LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND FURTHER STUDY

Apart from a general reference to the work and role of the NGOs made in this dissertation, more attention to the effect they had on tsunami reconstruction would be helpful. A particular role in their treatment of the conflict and how it was incorporated in their own work would give an interesting example of how vulnerability analysis could be included in the actual work of NGOs. Additionally, this dissertation is limited by not addressing the issue of social protection, or the social contract, that the GOSL or the LTTE may hold for the people of the Northern and Eastern provinces, due to constraints of space. Further research on the social contract would give a fuller understanding of the relationship between the GOSL and the LTTE, and may give a better explanation of why peace appears to be so elusive.

Another aspect of research that could not be included in this dissertation due to time and space is that of the role of religion, whether it is an important facet in understanding Sri Lanka's problems in tsunami reconstruction and the conflict. A comparison with Indonesia would also be useful here as Indonesia is predominantly one religion, Islam, while in Sri Lanka there are four: Buddhism (Sinhalese), Hinduism (Tamil), Islam (Muslim) and Christianity (Sinhalese and Tamil). Moving from that, a deeper understanding of the Indonesian peace process and that of Sri Lanka's would be interesting to research in detail, going more into the factors that were or were not present in Indonesia which led to the peace process. While some attention has been paid to Indonesia in this study, expanding on this would be of some academic interest.

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